How NOT to Manage a Project:
Conflict Management Lessons Learned from a DOD Case Study
J. Scott Sutterfield
Florida A&M University
School of Business and Industry
Shawnta S. Friday-Stroud
Florida A&M University
School of Business and Industry
Sheryl L. Shivers-Blackwell
Florida A&M University
School of Business and Industry
Abstract
This is a case study of a failed Department of Defense (DOD) project, even though it
was fully justified and badly needed. Project management within the DOD is a
complicated process. Projects are beset by the agenda of various stakeholders within
the DOD organizational structure. When this occurs, strong project management
leadership is necessary for success. This paper analyzes the potential causes of the
project failure resulting from the three domains of organizational conflict, and identifies
lessons learned from the failure via a conflict management perspective. Lessons
learned are presented to facilitate the management of interpersonal-based, task-based,
and process-based conflicts on the part of project managers and project sponsors, thus
increasing the likelihood of successful project management outcomes. This case study
fills a void in the project management literature by examining the relationship between
the three dimensions of organization conflict and the increase in various project costs,
and then offering a Project-Conflict Management Framework.
Introduction
Project management within the United States Department of Defense (DOD) has been
aptly described as the one of the world’s most complicated processes. Completion of
projects may require several years, and they can be difficult to manage under the best
of circumstances. If organizational conflict is superimposed upon the normal project
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 218
management difficulties, successful project outcomes are rendered immensely more
difficult. The complexity of DOD projects stems from the fact that various stakeholders
from above and below are likely to besiege the project manager. From above, there are
the senior financial executives whose jobs consist of constantly re-allocating resources.
More specifically, they typically re-allocate funds that have been awarded to a project
manager for his or her program. Within the DOD, the complexity also stems from the
appearance or perception that there have been times when the re-allocation of funds
has been done without any regard for national security or for those military missions that
might be of strategic importance to the military.
From below, there are the departmental or organizational managers who are vested in
protecting their own interests in the project, whether directly or indirectly. Often times,
these managers consider the authority and latitude for independent action accorded by
senior DOD management to the project manager to be an encroachment upon their
authority. Along with this, such departmental managers are concerned with preserving
their own organizations, and therefore attempt to compel the project manager to comply
with each and every regulation pertaining to their separate areas. This was especially
true in the late 1980s and early 1990s when the emphasis in the DOD was on
streamlining acquisition strategies to reduce the funding outlay and the time required for
fielding a system. At the time the Lighter Amphibian Heavy-Lift (LAMP-H) Project, which
will be described below, was extant, the time to field was typically 10 – 15 years, which
continues to be an issue and a matter of concern (Griffard, 2002; Office of Inspector
General, 2001). Departmental managers have been and still are concerned that any
attempt to shorten the acquisition process represents a threat to their various areas,
and are highly resistant to any approach to acquisition streamlining.
Consequently, departmental managers do everything within their power to compel full
compliance with all regulations, even though in many cases such compliance can be a
direct barrier to acquisition streamlining, greatly increase project cost and extend the
project schedule. All this results in systems that are unaffordable and frequently do not
satisfy their operational requirements. An environment with organizational conflict from
above and below is the type of environment within which most DOD project managers
frequently must function.
Literature Review
Organizational Conflict
Organizational conflict management is “ … a phenomenon that occurs between
interdependent parties as they experience negative emotional reactions to perceived
disagreements and interference with the attainment of their goals” (Barki & Hartwick,
1991). It has three main domains: interpersonal-based conflict, task-based conflict, and
process-based conflict (Coser, 1956, Guetkow & Gyr, 1954; Hearn & Anderson, 2002;
Jehn, 1995, 1997; Pinkley, 1990). Interpersonal-based conflict deals with relationship
tension between interdepartmental and intradepartmental individuals (Hearn &
Anderson, 2002).
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 219
Three dimensions of interpersonal conflict have been identified: interdependence,
disagreement, and interference (Barki & Hartwick, 2001; Putnam & Poole, 1987;
Thomas, 1992). Interdependence, a key structural pre-condition of any conflict, occurs
when the attainment of one party’s goals depends in some way on the actions of
another party (Barki & Hartwick, 2001). Disagreement, a key cognitive component of
interpersonal conflict, exists when one party’s values, needs, interests, opinions, goals,
or objectives are divergent from those of the other party (Barki & Hartwick, 2001).
Interference, the central behavioral characteristic of any conflict, refers to the opposition
that one party has with another party’s attainment of its interests, objectives or goals
(Barki & Hartwick, 2001).
Task-based conflict deals with tension that stems from whether or not certain tasks, or
requirements in the case of project management, should be pursued (Hearn &
Anderson, 2002). Process-based conflict deals with tension that stems from how tasks
should be completed (Hearn & Anderson, 2002). Although there is extensive research
regarding organizational conflict and its domains, there is a lack of research examining
the three domains of organizational conflict in the project management literature.
Therefore, this case study fills a void in the project management literature by examining
organizational conflict and its three domains, and offering a Project-Conflict
Management Framework. The next section will identify the potential costs associated
with conflict, followed by the specific forms of conflict along with the symptoms of that
conflict. The subsequent section will review the conflict process and conflict handling
intention strategies, and identify a Project-Conflict Management Framework.
Costs Associated with Conflict
The major lesson learned from the problem of organizational conflict identified in this
case study is that conflict stems from deviations. Those deviations can be with the
people, the plan, or the process. Kerzner (2003) stated that “…good up front planning
may reduce the number of changes required.” The minimization of changes or
deviations can enhance the chances of effective project execution. Unfortunately, the
various types of organizational conflict that arose concurrently throughout the LAMP-H
project, which will be identified and analyzed below, were not resolved or managed in a
way that led to effective project execution.
The problem of organizational conflict comes with a cost. The cost of the conflict is in
large part determined by the extent to which the conflict can be managed or resolved.
The costs associated with not effectively resolving or managing conflict in a complex
project setting are always detrimental, and can be fatal, as will be demonstrated below
by the eventual demise of the LAMP-H project. The cost of organizational conflict may
be viewed from a mathematical perspective. Consider a symmetric hyperbola of the
form …
x*y = c
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 220
with only positive values for “x” and “y.” The plot of this equation is in the first quadrant.
As “x” becomes small, “y” becomes very large, which causes the curve to become
asymptotic to the “y” axis, whereas if “y” becomes small, “x” becomes large, causing the
curve to become asymptotic to the “x” axis. Consider a similar function to describe the
relationship among the risk of conflict, the cost of conflict, the scheduling deviations due
to conflict, and expected performance. The function is as follows:
r = f(c,s,p)
where
r – overall risk of conflict
c – cost of conflict
s – scheduling deviations due to conflict
p – expected performance
This four dimensional equation would yield a hyper-surface where the risk of conflict
could be thought of as surfaces of constant value, analogous to the constant in the first
equation. These surfaces would be comprised of points such that
f(c,s,p) = r = constant.
Any attempt to change one of the variables, say expected performance, without a
corresponding change in the other variables would move the resulting point to another
risk surface. For example, if one attempted to increase the expected performance
without corresponding increases in cost and scheduling, one would move to a new
surface with an increased level of risk. As will be described below, this is precisely what
occurred as a result of the interpersonal-, task-, and process-based conflict that
occurred throughout the LAMP-H project.
The Conflict Process
The conflict process can be viewed as having five stages: (1) potential opposition or
incompatibility, (2) cognition and personalization, (3) intentions, (4) behavior and (5)
outcomes (Robbins & Judge, 2005). Stage 1 is characterized by the presence of
conditions that create opportunities for conflict to arise, for example, communication,
structure, and personal variables. Stage 2 occurs when the potential for opposition or
incompatibility negatively affects another party or becomes actualized. Stage 3 occurs
when a decision is made to act in a certain way. This stage is characterized by twodimensional cooperativeness (the degree to which one party attempts to satisfy the
other party’s concerns) and assertiveness (the degree to which one party attempts to
satisfy his own concerns). From these two dimensions five conflict handling intentions
are identified: avoiding (unassertive and uncooperative), competing (assertive and
uncooperative), accommodating (unassertive and cooperative), compromising
(midrange on both assertiveness and cooperativeness), and collaborating (assertive
and cooperative) (Robbins & Judge, 2005; Thomas, 1992).
Hocker and Wilmot (1998) note that avoiding occurs when people physically or
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 221
psychologically remove themselves from the conflict scene or episode often by denying
the conflict, being indirect and evasive, changing and/or avoiding topics, employing
noncommittal remarks, and making irrelevant remarks or joking as a way to avoid
dealing with the conflict (Gross & Guerro, 2000, p. 207). The competing style relies on
the use of position power, aggression, verbal dominance, and perseverance. Hocker
and Wilmot (1998) state that behaviors associated with this style include confrontational
remarks, accusations, personal criticism, rejection, hostile imperatives or threats,
antagonistic jokes or teasing, aggressive questions, presumptive remarks, and denial of
responsibility at the expense of others (Gross & Guerro, 2000, p. 206). Papa and
Canary (1995) suggest that the competing style may be effective however inappropriate
in organizational contexts where there are production-related goals (Gross & Guerro,
2000).
Hocker and Wilmot (1998) note that the accommodating style is associated with putting
aside one’s own needs to please others, passively accepting the decisions of others,
making yielding or conceding statements, and explicitly expressing harmony and
cooperation during a conflict episode (Gross & Guerro, 2000). The compromising style
is characterized as being focused on individual goals as well as the needs of others
(Blake & Mouton, 1964; Gross & Guerro, 2000). Hocker and Wilmot (1998) state that
this style requires searching for an intermediate position, through strategies such as
splitting the difference, meeting the partner halfway, suggesting a trade-off, maximizing
wins while minimizing losses, and offering a quick, short-term resolution to the conflict
(Gross & Guerro, 2000, p. 208). Lastly, the collaboration style is viewed as both
effective and appropriate in managing conflict because it provides disputants with
access to other’s perceptions of incompatible goals, thereby enabling them to find a
solution that integrates the goals and needs of both parties (Tutzauer & Roloff, 1988;
Gross & Guerro, 2000).
Stage 4 is considered the behavior stage and includes statements, actions, and
reactions made by the conflicting parties. Lastly, Stage 5 occurs when the actionreaction interplay results in functional or dysfunctional conflict (Robbins & Judge, 2005).
The next section will identify conflict handling intention strategies for each symptom
based on the domain classification in the context of a Project-Conflict Management
Framework.
Project-Conflict Management Framework
Given the need for project managers to make decisions in the midst of organizational
conflict, the conflict management process and decision-making process have been
merged and modified to fit the field of project management, and its step-by-step
approach (Kimmons, 1992). The resulting Project-Conflict Management Framework
suggests the following:
1. Identification of conflict as the problem
2. Identification of symptoms of the problem and classification of them as
interpersonal-, task-, or process-based conflict
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 222
3. Setting strategy selection criteria
4. Identification of alternative conflict handling intention strategies for each symptom
based on domain classification
a. Avoiding (Neglecting, Withdrawing)
b. Competing (Asserting, Distributive, Dominating, Forcing)
c. Accommodating (Appeasing, Obliging)
d. Compromise (Sharing)
e. Collaboration (Integration, Problem-Solving)
5. Selection of conflict handling intention strategies for each symptom identified,
many of which may need to be employed concurrently
6. Implementation of selected conflict handling intention strategies, concurrently if
necessary.
Following the introduction and overview of the DOD LAMP-H case study below, the
Project-Conflict Management Framework will be used to articulate conflict management
lessons learned from the LAMP project. The practical applications will be delineated
from the case analysis using the Project-Conflict Management Framework to provide
project managers with a guide for how to identify and resolve interpersonal-, task-, and
process-based conflict.
LAMP-H Case Study
This paper articulates the LAMP-H project’s history based on the use of archival data
and observations (Eisenhardt, 1989). Next, various project phases are analyzed, along
with departmental concerns at each phase. Then, specific project conflicts and their
symptoms are identified and analyzed based using the Project-Conflict Management
Framework. Lastly, practical lessons learned are shared in an effort to enhance future
decision-making and improve the management and resolution of conflicts for successful
project outcomes.
The Lighter Amphibian Heavy-Lift (LAMP-H) Project was initiated by the U. S. Army to
acquire amphibious heavy-lift capability. The term “lighter” refers to the function
performed by a craft in moving supplies from large carrier ships to the shore. The term
“amphibian” refers to the motion of the craft, that is, its capability of moving over the
surface of water and then transitioning to movement over land. Because of the
requirement to move over both water and land, amphibians are usually, though not
always, air-cushioned vehicles. This means that such a vehicle glides on a cushion of
air, an inch or two above the surface over which it moves. The requirement for this
capability had been identified as essential for the Army’s logistic re-supply mission for
numerous areas of strategic interest in the world. The purpose of the LAMP-H was to
support the ground troops during amphibious assault missions. The operational concept
of the LAMP-H was that it would follow the troops on to the beach and provide them
with the supplies necessary to sustain their ground assault.
Although the need for the LAMP-H had been identified, the project had languished for
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 223
approximately 10 years due to internal disputes about what the capabilities of such a
vehicle should be. In particular, two points of contention were the payload and the
speed. Some thought that it should be capable of carrying two M-70 tanks, a payload of
approximately 140 tons, at a relatively low airspeed. Others argued that it should have a
lower payload and be able to fly at a greater airspeed. Some believed that it should be
powered by paddlewheels that would propel it through the water until it reached the
beach, and thereafter by large deeply treaded tires over the sand. Others believed that
two large Archimedean screws should power it. It was argued that this would suffice for
propulsion over sea or sand. Still others argued that the LAMP-H should be driven with
ducted propellers. Along with this diversity of opinion, there was also wide disagreement
as to just how many LAMP-H units should be purchased and at what unit price. Finally,
the user of the system, the Transportation School (T-School), was no longer certain that
it wanted or needed the LAMP-H system. Although the program had floundered along
for about 10 years, it is likely to have survived as a result of the “seductive appeal of
collective belief” (Royer, 2003) by those involved with the project because of their
perceptions regarding the importance and significance of having LAMP-Hs in the Army’s
arsenal. While a description of highlighted project events is delineated below, Table 1
is a timeline that delineates the chronology of the events to be described.
Table 1. Chronology of LAMP-H Activities and Events
Activity/Event Date
Identification of LAMP-H Requirement Year 1
Deputy Project Manager Appointed Sept, Year 10
Requirements Analysis (RA) Undertaken Sept, Year 11
RA Results are Forthcoming
Nov, Year 11 – May
87, Year 12
PEO Structure Established Mar, Year 12
New PEO Appointed Apr, Year 12
New Project Manager Appointed July, Year 12
RA results in Project Funds Restoration Aug, Year 12
RA Refinement and Project Coordination in
DOD
Sep, Year 12 – Jun,
Year 13
Matrix Management Team Formed Jul, Year 13
Program Management Documents
Preparation
Jul, Year 13 – Dec,
Year 14
IPR to Enter Development Phase Dec, Year 14
Continuing Conflict Over Requirements Jan – Jun, Year 15
New Project Manager Appointed Jul, Year 15
Deputy Project Manager Reassigned Mar, Year 16
Request for Proposal (RFP) Released Jan, Year 16
LAMP-H Project Terminated Jun, Year 16
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 224
Program Development Infancy
The project manager of the LAMP-H Project was surprised at the great diversity of
opinion surrounding the LAMP-H project, and wondered how this project became so
controversial given its potential usefulness to the Army’s arsenal. Not only was there
great diversity as to the technical requirements for the LAMP-Hs, but there was also an
equally great divergence as to the Acquisition Strategy for the system. Management at
the Army Watercraft R&D Center at Fort Belvoir, VA, believed that no R&D was
necessary for the LAMP-H. They believed that it could be purchased “off-the-shelf”
from a commercial firm, and that the propulsion system could then be integrated. This
would have necessitated only a single In-Process Review (IPR), thus greatly simplifying
production approval for the project. It was evident, however, that there were some
significant problems with this approach. First, not all of the technology required was
state-of-the-art. Second, the subsystems to be used for the LAMP-H had never been
integrated before. It seemed, therefore, that the LAMP-H Project could best be executed
as an Army Streamlined Acquisition Program (ASAP) that would involve two IPRs: the
first to obtain approval for proceeding with the R&D phase, and the second upon
completion of the R&D phase, to approve the LAMP-H as having satisfied all R&D requirements, and as being ready for transition into the production phase.
A third issue that had plagued the LAMP-H Project since its inception was that of
funding cuts. It was discovered that this was due to the fact that performance
characteristics for the LAMP-H had never been defined. Hence, it became evident that a
requirements analysis would be needed in order to provide documented rationale for
funding the LAMP-H in order to put an end to all speculation as to the LAMP-H
configuration specifications. The requirements analysis would also determine the
number of craft to be acquired in order to best satisfy the LAMP-H mission. Since the
Department of Army was threatening to withdraw funds, a requirements analysis was
immediately initiated with an independent systems analysis organization. Soon positive
results were forthcoming, and they immediately began to breathe new life into the
LAMP-H project. To understand the vital importance of the requirements analysis in
defending the LAMP-H project budget, it is necessary to understand the organizational
structure within the DOD’s Department of Army, which is described pictorially by the
organization chart in Figure 1.
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 225
Figure 1. Army Structure before Implementing PEO
DoD
Navy Army Air Force
Army
Materiel
Command
Test &
Evaluatio
n
Training &
Doctrine
Command
Other
Troop
Support
Command
Transportation
School
(T-School)
Other
Ft. Belvoir
R&D Center
Watercraft
PM
Within the Department of Army’s organizational structure, the line of authority for the
Watercraft project manager reached through the Troop Support Command, through the
Army Materiel Command to the Department of Army staff. In practical terms, this meant
that the Army Materiel Command controlled the funds for all Watercraft Product
Managers’ programs and projects. Although the Department of Army staff had been
generally favorable toward the LAMP-H project, in the absence of a requirements
analysis, they had no basis for defending against the Army Materiel Command
management for LAMP-H funds. However, as results from the requirements analysis
were forthcoming, they were used in a major consensus building effort to demonstrate
the need for the LAMP-H project. The consensus building was done by briefing high
levels of Department of Army management and the DOD staff on the requirements
analysis results. Once the Department of Army staff had a sound rationale for
supporting the LAMP-H project, the Army Materiel Command was no longer able to
arbitrarily cut funds, which enabled progress to be made on the project. An Acquisition
Strategy was developed based on the results of the requirements analysis, consistent
with the technical requirements shown to be necessary for the LAMP-H craft, which
further solidified the program.
As requirements analysis results became available, it became obvious that the LAMP-H
should not carry two Abrams tanks at a relatively low speed. Instead, it needed to have
a payload of about 90 tons, 50 tons less than that for two Abrams tanks, and to be
capable of traveling about 15 to 20 knots in a fully loaded condition. These
characteristics maximized the off-load capability of the craft, and minimized the number
of LAMP-H craft required to execute the off-load mission, which as the analysis
indicated, was about 30 craft. Another very significant result from the requirements
analysis was that the craft would have to be propelled by ducted airscrews in order to
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 226
satisfactorily complete the mission. Lastly, the results indicated that each LAMP-H craft
could be acquired for approximately 15 million dollars.
An Army Streamlined Acquisition Program (ASAP) approach would be required
because of the need to further develop some of the technology and to perform a
systems integration effort. The results from the requirements analysis made it possible
to move quickly to ensure that adequate funds were programmed for the acquisition,
and to refine the Acquisition Strategy. Once the results from the requirements analysis
became available, the Transportation School (T-School) became an enthusiastic
supporter of the program. The management at Watercraft R&D Center, however, was
very much annoyed at having been shown to be technically incorrect; thus, they only
half-heartedly supported the program. Even so, the LAMP-H project appeared at last to
have been established as a viable project. However, as it turned out, it was only the
beginning of the problems with the LAMP-H project.
Program Development Maturation
Two very significant senior leadership changes occurred shortly after the LAMP-H
project was solidified as a viable project. First, a senior position called the Program
Executive Officer (PEO) was established throughout the Department of Army to provide
an executive sponsor for each program. A visual of how the new PEO structure
affected the lines of authority in the Department of Army organizational structure is
shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Army Structure after Implementing PEO
DoD
Navy Army Air Force
Army
Materiel
Command
Test &
Evaluatio
n
Training &
Doctrine
Command
Other
Troop
Support
Command
Transportation
School
(T-School)
Other Program
Executive
Officer
Ft. Belvoir
R&D Center
Watercraft
PM
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 227
The implementation of the PEO structure led to the Project/Program Managers being
taken from under the Troop Support Command, and being placed under the authority of
the new PEO. This same organizational change was made with all
Product/Project/Program Managers under the Army Materiel Command. As a result,
the PEOs reported directly to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research,
Development and Acquisition (ASARDA), which meant that the PEOs were placed in
charge of all programs/projects, and that the Army Materiel Command no longer had
any management control of the programs. Hence, the Army Command could no longer
take funds from programs, which was an early try at achieving what Matta and
Ashkenas (2003) call “Balancing Vertical and Horizontal Activities.” Combined with a
matrix management approach, this theoretically provided the capability to achieve rapid
results both vertically and horizontally, which was precisely what the Department of
Army had envisioned when it reorganized into the PEO structure (Kerzner, 2003).
The Program Executive Officer (PEO) position over the Watercraft project manager was
filled by a man who came from a senior position on the Department of Army staff.
Although he was supposed to have been the LAMP-H program sponsor and to have
supported the program at the senior levels in the Department of Army and the DOD, he
came to his new position with no acquisition experience. As the project drew on, it
became apparent that he neither understood the significance of the program nor it’s
Acquisition Strategy.
The second leadership change that occurred in the Watercraft Product Manager
organization (the LAMP-H’s home) was the appointment of a new Product Manager
(PM). This new PM had also come directly from the DOD. But unlike the PEO, this new
project manager had come with an excellent acquisition background. He had completed
the DOD Program Management School where he had learned many new ideas as to
how systems should be acquired. As a result of his training, he believed that he should
be firmly in control of his programs. He was a staunch advocate of the Army
Streamlined Acquisition Program (ASAP) approach to systems acquisition, which led
him to be an enthusiastic supporter of the LAMP-H Acquisition Strategy. The new PM,
as it turned out, proved to be a very effective manager. He had come to accept new
approaches regarding concurrent engineering and the need to build prototypes on
production tooling in order to minimize the number of system configuration changes.
Shortly thereafter, the LAMP-H project manager was promoted to Deputy Product
Manager (DPM) and began to enthusiastically promote these new approaches. This
resulted in the new PM and his Deputy being in direct conflict with their new boss, the
PEO, and departmental managers and workers on whom the project/product managers
relied for matrix support (Kerzner, 2004; Killian, 1971). Although the PEO ostensibly
supported the LAMP-H program, he obscurely entertained great reservations about it.
The PEO’s lack of knowledge about the basic acquisition process prevented him from
understanding any new innovations to the acquisition process. Additionally, the PEO
preferred to abstain from conflict with departmental managers and workers, and thus,
became very nervous with disagreements that the departmental managers and workers
had with the new PM and the DPM regarding the new approaches taken with respect
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 228
the project. The PEO, as it turned out, valued political favor above his mission.
The PEO’s true intentions about the LAMP-H project were revealed when the R&D
funds for the LAMP-H project were cut. It was essential that the R&D funds be restored,
so as to not cause the program to suffer a break in activity. Although the PEO had the
power to restore the funds, he continually delayed the restoration, which caused
slippage and the need for the entire Acquisition Strategy to be revised and re-justified. It
later became clear, that he was hoping his benign neglect of the LAMP-H project would
cause program termination because the complexity of an R&D program with two IPRs
made him very nervous.
Another factor that delayed the program was the T-School’s untimely completion of the
Required Operational Capability (ROC) Document (Metzger, 2003), which is
indispensable in DOD acquisitions. The ROC legitimizes a project by specifying the
exact capabilities to be acquired. ROC approval was required before R&D funds could
be spent on further project development. To this point, the ROC had only been
circulated in draft form, and had existed in this unapproved form for seven years with
almost no attention. Revision and staffing of this document were handled in a very
nonchalant way even though the T-School had been told on several occasions that the
ROC had to be approved before funds could be spent on the LAMP-H program.
IPR Approval Process
The in-process review (IPR) period proved to be an interesting time for the project
manager and his deputy. The IPR authorized the release of the Request for Proposal
(RFP) to invite submissions detailing how a contractor would, if selected, construct a
vehicle to satisfy the LAMP-H requirements. The preparations required for the IPR and
the release of the RFP included four principal program management documents: the
ROC; the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP); the Integrated Logistics Support
Plan (ILSP); and the Acquisition Strategy. The TEMP and the ILSP could be taken to
the IPR in draft format; however, it was necessary that the ROC and the Acquisition
Strategy be approved prior to the IPR. A matrix team was formed and a small contract
executed for preparation of the Acquisition Strategy, the ILSP, and some of the program
management documents, so that the outputs needed would be completed in time for the
IPR. The Watercraft R&D Center in coordination with the Test and Evaluation
Command (TECOM) was tasked with preparing the TEMP.
Program Destruction
In order to proceed with the development for the LAMP-H system was to have been
released just after the in-process review (IPR). After all of the effort exerted on the
LAMP-H by various stakeholders, unfortunately, this deadline was not met. The PM
and the DPM moved on to other positions shortly after the missed deadline. The RFP
still had not been released at the time of their departure. Subsequently, a new
inexperienced project management team was formed, and unfortunately willing to
accommodate whatever might be requested by various stakeholders, regardless of
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 229
whether the requests were supported by the requirements analysis. Finally, the RFP,
which was expanded to include all of the special interests and additional requirements,
was released twelve months late. When the bids arrived from the contractors, it was
evident that something was terribly wrong. It seemed that the inflated requirements had
led the contractors to bid from 175 million to 225 million dollars for the R&D portion of
the project while only 50 million dollars had been budgeted and approved. Also, the unit
cost of the LAMP-H as bid by the contractors ranged from 30 million to 43 million dollars
wherein only 15 million dollars per unit had been budgeted. An attempt was made by
the new PM to obtain more R&D funds and to extend the program by another year. This
resulted in withdrawal of the production funds and cancellation of the LAMP-H project
within a short time after the request. And so, after the expenditure of many thousands of
man-hours and dollars over a 15 year time period, a fully justified system that was badly
needed by the military was terminated at a cost of 5 million dollars to U.S. taxpayers.
LAMP-H Case Analysis & Conflict Identification
The major problem identified and the focus of this case study is organizational conflict
management, which has three main domains as previously discussed: interpersonalbased conflict, task-based conflict, and process-based conflict (Coser, 1956, Guetkow &
Gyr, 1954; Hearn & Anderson, 2002; Jehn, 1995, 1997; Pinkley, 1990). As articulated
above, the inability to manage or resolve the various types of organizational conflicts
that occurred throughout the LAMP-H project led to costly people, plan, and process
deviations. More specifically, the attempts by the various stakeholders to increase the
expected performance of the LAMP-H without corresponding increases to the budget
and timelines to account for the increased costs and scheduling, led to an increased
level of risk, and ultimately, the demise of the LAMP-H project. The next section will
describe the interpersonal-, task-, and process-based conflicts that took place
throughout the LAMP-H project, which will be followed by practical conflict management
lessons that managers can learn from the DOD LAMP-H project.
Interpersonal-Based Conflict
Symptom #1: Interpersonal/Interdepartmental Conflict between Project Manager and
TECOM & Project Sponsor
The Acquisition Strategy required that the R&D phase of the LAMP-H program be
executed within 36 months. This was done in order to conform to the three years of
R&D appropriation that had been programmed, and the guidelines of the Army
Streamlined Acquisition Program (ASAP). This meant that the TECOM community had
to tailor its test program so that it could be completed within the ASAP structure, which
is a process-based conflict that led to an interpersonal/interdepartmental conflict. This
led to a sharp reaction from Test and Evaluation Command (TECOM) personnel who
insisted upon having a “business-as-usual” test program. Though it was demonstrated
that a perfectly satisfactory test program could be achieved by tailoring the standard test
program to the demands of the ASAP and that acquisition regulations provided for such
a program, the testers were completely inflexible on the matter. Even after it was
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 230
pointed out that lengthening the test program would cause the program to slip and result
in the loss of the LAMP-H project, the testers were still not willing to tailor the test
program. All of this led to a sharp conflict between the PM and TECOM. Although the
PEO was the program sponsor and should have mediated this problem, he exhibited an
aloof indifference and avoided lending any help to the PM in terms of problem
resolution. This conflict continued between TECOM and the PM, thru the In-Process
Review (IPR) period, until the LAMP-H program was eventually terminated.
Symptom #2: Interpersonal/Interdepartmental Conflict between Watercraft R&D Center
and Contractor R&D Center
Another area of serious conflict was in the preparation of the Request for Proposal
(RFP), which is a task-based conflict that led to an interpersonal/interdepartmental
conflict. In order to expedite preparation of the RFP, the aid of a support contractor had
been enlisted. About the time that the RFP was complete, the Watercraft R&D Center
protested that it must prepare the RFP. Although the Program Executive Officer (PEO)
could have prevailed against this protest, he failed to do so, supporting the R&D
Center’s position, and permitted them to prepare the RFP. Instead of taking the then
complete RFP and making any refinements that might have been required, the
Watercraft R&D Center started over, entirely from the beginning, completely redoing the
RFP. This ultimately resulted in a program delay of about twelve months.
Symptom #3: Interpersonal/Interdepartmental Conflict between Transportation School
and Legal Advisory Department
The Source Selection Plan was an area of conflict between the Transportation School
and the Legal Advisory Department because of the Legal Advisory Department’s
objection to the Source Selection Plan having been based upon a “best value” selection
criterion. Although the acquisition regulations provided for a “best value” approach to
source selection, it seems that legal advisory personnel had never been involved in any
such approach to source selection and were afraid to attempt it because, “We’ve never
done it that way before.” Therefore, this process-based conflict led to another
interpersonal/interdepartmental conflict. The legal advisor, subsequently, insisted upon
a complete revision of the Source Selection Plan. So it was with great dissention, a
sharply divided state of affairs, and great reservations upon the part of the PM that the
LAMP-H project was taken to the Milestone II In-Process Review to obtain approval for
entry into the development phase.
Task-Based Conflict
Symptom #1: Task Conflict as to the Logistical Support System
This area of conflict had to do with the logistical support system for LAMP-H. Since the
LAMP-H was to have been a low-density system, the requirements analysis disclosed
that 30 LAMP-H systems should have been purchased. With no repurchase
contemplated, a tailored logistical support concept had been developed in which testing
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 231
of the logistical support package was to have been done during developmental testing
of LAMP-H. This also provoked a reaction from the logistical community. As had been
the case with the testers, the logisticians were also unwilling to tailor their desires to
meet the demands of the ASAP program for the LAMP-H project. This problem area
was never entirely resolved before the first IPR.
Symptom #2: Task Conflict about Data Requirements
Another area of conflict that arose as the program management documents were being
prepared had to do with the amount of data that would be requested by the government
in the RFP. The testers, the logisticians, and the engineers all wanted large quantities of
data, far more than was reasonably required. The project manager was emphatic that
such large quantities of data were far too costly and were not required for a project such
as the LAMP-H. This dispute continued until well after the first IPR, and eventually
delayed the release of the RFP.
Symptom #3: Task Conflict about Product Requirements
When the T-School finally produced its approved ROC, it was evident that it had
become an enthusiastic supporter of the LAMP-H program. The T-School had become
so enthusiastic that it had inflated requirements in the ROC far beyond what could be
operationally justified. It insisted upon having a payload of two Abrams tanks, even
though this was not supported by the requirements analysis. It also insisted that the
LAMP-H be decontamination survivable, an immensely expensive requirement. A third
requirement that had never been contemplated during the program planning was a
computerized maintenance diagnostic system. When it was pointed out to the T-school
that previous planning had never included these requirements and that there was not
sufficient funding programmed to pay for them, the reaction was one of indifference.
Even admonitions that the program might be canceled failed to elicit any change of
attitude.
Process-Based Conflict
Symptom #1: Conflict pertaining to Timing of the Requirements Analysis in the Process
The requirements analysis is typically done early in the project management process so
that all product and project specifications and funding requirements are defined. In this
case, a requirements analysis was not completed at the inception of the project.
Unfortunately, the requirements analysis was not initiated until the Department of Army
threatened to withdraw funds for the projects. The requirements analysis was
eventually conducted and the results were used to support the continuation of the
project.
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 232
Symptom #2: Conflict regarding the Process of Awarding Scoring Weights
The Source Selection Plan also proved to be another area of sharp contention. In order
to emphasize logistical supportability and low operation and maintenance costs, the
DPM had written the plan so as to reward the greatest scoring weight in the area of
supportability, with performance having a lesser weight. The Transportation School
insisted, however, that performance have the greatest scoring weight. Even though it
was pointed out that this was in conflict with the requirement to minimize operation and
maintenance costs, Transportation School personnel refused to retract their position.
Symptom #3: Process Conflict within the Matrix Support Structure
Theoretically, the matrix management approach should have provided the capability to
achieve rapid results both vertically and horizontally, which was precisely what the
Department of Army had envisioned when it reorganized to the PEO structure.
However, the PEO’s lack of knowledge about the basic acquisition process and his
preference to avoid conflict with departmental managers and workers led to a lack of
consensus in decision-making at the necessary authority levels. As previously stated,
this resulted in the new PM and his DPM being in direct conflict with their new boss, the
PEO, departmental managers and workers upon whom PMs relied for matrix support
(Kerzner, 2004; Killian, 1971).
Practical Implications of the DOD LAMP-H Project
Interpersonal-Based Conflict Management Lesson – Use Compromise or Collaboration
Strategy
It is vitally important to the success of a project that the project manager effectively
manages his or her relationships with the project sponsor, other relevant organizational
managers, and contractors. Oftentimes, the management of these relationships must
take place concurrently throughout the life of the project. As evidenced by this case
analysis of the LAMP-H project, the project manager, for various reasons, was unable to
successfully manage the multiple relationships with the various entities that were
involved in the project.
In the case of managing his or her relationship with the project sponsor, it is suggested
that the project manager execute a collaboration strategy. While this strategy may take
the longest of all of the conflict management strategies to implement, it is very important
that the project manager and the project sponsor are in full agreement about all details
regarding the project if a successful outcome is desired. With respect to the
management of his or her relationships with other relevant organizational managers and
contractors, the project manager may want to employ a compromise strategy or a
collaboration strategy when necessary. Without the cooperation of the other managers
and the contractors, it is unlikely that the project will be a success.
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 233
Task-Based Conflict Management Lesson – Use Competing, Compromise, or
Collaboration Strategy
Another critical conflict area for a project manager to manage is project requirements or
tasks. Typically, project requirements are stipulated at the onset of a project. When the
requirements, whether they are product requirements or data requirements, as in this
case, are changed significantly late in the project process or much beyond the original
scope of the project, it puts the completion of the project at risk. The project manager
needs to determine the power, position, or influence of the stakeholder to determine
which conflict management strategy to employ. If the project stakeholder has very little
power or influence, and is not in a position to detrimentally impact the project, then the
project manager may want to use the competing strategy. If the project stakeholder
holds a fair amount of power and influence, and is in a position to detrimentally impact
the project, the project manager would want to use the collaboration strategy if time
permits or the compromise strategy if time is of the essence.
Process-Based Conflict Management Lesson – Use Competing or Compromise
Strategy
A third potential area for conflict is with the project process. In project management,
there are sequences of events that must take place in order for the project to progress
successfully. In many cases, the steps in the process are not controlled by the project
manager because they are mandated or required from above. When steps in the
process are mandated, the project manager should use a competing strategy to get all
project stakeholders to comply with the required steps. It would be helpful if the project
manager educates the project stakeholders as to why the steps are required and as to
why he or she is forcing everyone to comply with the steps. In some cases, the steps
may consist of general guidelines and not mandates. When the steps allow for flexibility
in the guidelines, then the project manager has some leeway, and therefore, may want
to use a compromising strategy so that all project stakeholders have some input in the
process where possible.
Another area of process-based conflict was the organizational structure. The goal of
the matrix support structure is to help balance the necessary authority levels between
functional and project management so that a consistent message is communicated from
one organizational level to another. Thus, each authority level must adopt a group or
consensus-based approach to decision making to ensure that a workable compromising
strategy is achieved, thus avoiding authority conflicts and reducing the risk of projects
becoming politicized. Dooley, Lupton, and O’Sullivan (2005) note that management can
address potential conflicts between authority levels by making the reporting lines in the
matrix structure transparent; otherwise workers will find themselves answering to
multiple bosses and attempting to reconcile varying directions. Thus, the matrix
structure could not achieve its intended purpose which was to balance operational
issues (functionality driven) with developmental issues (project driven) due to the lack of
a compromising strategy.
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 234
Inter-Domain Conflict Management Lesson
Conflict as articulated mathematically above, if not managed properly, can be
detrimental to a project. Most projects cannot withstand significant overruns due to
change in time and costs as a result of interpersonal-based conflict, task-based conflict,
process-based conflict, or inter-domain conflict, which is some combination of three.
Although change, risk, and conflict are inevitable in any project, “unmanaged change”
(Kerzner, 2003), unmanaged risk, and unmanaged conflict are likely to contribute to a
project’s demise. Kerzner (2003:695) states that …
Another critical interdependency is the relationship between change
management and risk management. …Risks and Changes go hand in hand,
which is one of the reasons companies usually integrate risk management
and change management into a singular methodology. … If changes are
unmanaged, then more time and money are needed to perform risk
management, which often takes on the appearance of and behavior of crisis
management.
Al-tabtabai, Alex, and Abou-alfotouh (2001) discuss some of the causes of
organizational conflict. One such cause, according to these authors, is that of
managerial conflict. Managerial conflict is said to arise from “… differing practices
advocated by respective organizations under different managerial units” (Al-tabtabai et
al., 2001), which is an example of the interpersonal-based conflicts that took place
within the LAMP-H project. Concurrently, task-based conflicts with conflicting product
and data requirements and various process-based conflicts discussed above were also
occurring. Thus, by the very nature of complex projects, whether large-, medium-, or
small-scale, project managers of today must learn to develop effective conflict
management skills and employ appropriate conflict handling intention strategies
concurrently if they are to be successful in accomplishing their desired outcomes.
Additionally, they must exercise individual strategic flexibility, which is defined as the
“…capability to identify major changes in the external environment … to quickly commit
resources to new courses of action in response to change …” (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004).
Project managers must also be able to identify and effectively manage major and subtle
internal environmental changes, which are likely to include inter-domain conflict.
Conclusion
The effectiveness of individual employees, teas and entire organizations depends on
how they manage conflict at work (Tjosvold, 1998). Managers spend an average of 20
per cent of their time managing conflict (Thomas, 1992), and evidence suggests conflict
and conflict management substantially influence individual, group and organizational
effectiveness. Managers must recognize that the deployment of situationally appropriate responses to conflict should produce more positive individual, group, and
organizational outcomes (Callanan & Perri, 2006). Given the practical importance of
conflict management in organizations, it is vital to use and develop theory in this area to
offer project managers practical frameworks that can enable them to make better
© 2007 Institute of Behavioral and Applied Management. All Rights Reserved. 235
decisions (Dreu, Evers, Beersma, Kluwer, Nauta, 2001).
It has been stated previously that project management within the DOD is likely one of
the most complex processes in the world. The LAMP-H project is an excellent example
of how not to manage conflict within a project. Almost every conceivable obstacle
relating to the three domains of conflict and inter-domain conflict that might be found in
project management was encountered on the LAMP-H project. In fact, the organizational conflicts continued throughout the life of the project. The organizational conflict
pitfalls illustrated in this case study can lead to the failure of a project. The conflicts
identified in this case stemmed from conflicting relationships between and among
various project stakeholders around interpersonal/interdepartmental, task and process
requirements.
Nevertheless, practical conflict management lessons can be learned from this case
study to enhance the likelihood of successfully managing and/or resolving conflicts that
are likely to emerge while working on a project. Some factors that could contribute to
the successful management of conflict on a project that can be learned from this case
study are the need for a project manager to be able to identify the types or domains of
conflict that are likely to take place concurrently and implement the appropriate conflict
handling intention strategies concurrently to resolve or manage the conflicts. The
pitfalls identified, the Project-Conflict Management Framework offered, and the lessons
learned from this case study should facilitate project managers in making better
decisions when dealing with conflict that can significantly increase the likelihood of a
successful project management outcome.
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